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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
4th Cir.
Berghoff v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 17-1336, 2018 WL 4044059
(4th Cir. Aug. 24, 2018).
Mineral Owners (“Owners”) executed mineral lease, which gave Company
the right to extract oil and gas from their properties and contained a pooling
provision. The lease required Company to notify Owner of any pooling. A
conditional five-year secondary term followed a five-year primary term if
the Company was still operating in the search for oil and gas at the
expiration of the primary term. Due to a dispute regarding the location of
the well pad, Company built the well on an adjacent plot, where it could
still successfully pool with Owners’ parcel. Owners sought declaratory
relief that the lease expired at the end of the primary term and sought
compensatory damages for Company’s unauthorized extraction following
the lease’s expiration. The court found that Company failed to comply with
its notification requirements regarding the pooling during the primary term,
and thus failed to extend the lease. Company mailed its notification two
years after the pooling declaration was recorded, but, since mailing was a
prerequisite to pooling, Company never actually completed the pooling in
accordance with the lease. Company’s defense of the doctrine of substantial
performance failed, as Owners did not prevent Company from complying
with the pooling provision; in such cases the doctrine of substantial
performance would have been successful only if misconduct by lessor had
prevented lessee from fulfilling its duties. By failing to comply strictly with
the terms of the lease, Company failed to extend the lease.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.

S.D. Alabama
Matthews v. Ankor Energy, LLC, No. 17-0062-CG-B, 2018 WL 3832851
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2018).
Landowner alleged Company committed waste and breached implied
covenants contained in oil and gas leases issued by Landowner. This matter
comes from the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss4/6

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

567

pertaining to the case. The magistrate judge concluded that Defendants’
motions to dismiss the case should only be granted as to their contention
“that count five should be dismissed because no statutory claim for waste
exists under Ala. Code § 9-17-19.” The magistrate judge concluded that the
motions to dismiss should be denied as to Defendants’ other bases.
Landowner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of Count Five
concerning the statutory claim for waste and Company moved for review of
the dismissal of the motion to dismiss on all other grounds. The court
concurred with the conclusions of the magistrate judge as to the dismissal
of Company’s motion to dismiss, finding: (1) it was not necessary to invoke
primary jurisdiction to the State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama; (2)
Landowners had exhausted their administrative remedies; (3) Landowners’
complaint was not an improper collateral attack on the Board’s Orders; (4)
Landowners’ complaint was not barred by res judicata; (5) Landowner did
not fail to comply with the notice requirements in the lease; (6) Landowner
may be able to maintain tort claims because they may arise from duties
created by the leases, and it would be inappropriate to dismiss tort claims at
this time; (7) Company had not shown orders that supersede the contractual
terms; and (8) Company could not show Landowner could not recover for
punitive damages. As to Landowner’s request for consideration, the court
found that the Alabama statute did provide a private right of action for
waste, and Count Five of the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
Thus, Company’s motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety.
D. Idaho
Citizens Allied for Integrity & Accountability, Inc. v. Schultz, No. 1:17-cv00264-BLW, 2018 WL 3848397 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2018).
Mineral interest owners (“Owners”) brought action against the Idaho
Department of Lands (“IDL”) and the Idaho Oil and Gas Conservation
Committee (“IOGCC”) for violation of their due process rights, alleging
that IDL and IOGCC violated their rights by failing to provide meaningful
opportunity to oppose an integration application filed by an oil and gas
operator (“Operator”) seeking to develop a pool of natural gas. Following
the issuance of the Final Order by the IOGCC approving the integration
application, Owners filed a complaint challenging the Final Order under 42
U.S.C §1983, which provides a remedy for the violation of constitutional
rights. Owners sought summary judgement on all claims except as to
financial damages, and IDL and IOGCC sought summary judgement as to
all of Owners’ claims. To establish a due process violation, Owner must
show a protected property interest and a deprivation of the property without
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receiving the process that is constitutionally due. The court found that a due
process violation occurred to the extent that Owners’ motion for partial
summary judgment was granted and the cross motion was denied in part.
Specifically, Owner had a protected property interest; because the Idaho
legislature had decided “that for landowners with the property overlying a
pool of hydrocarbons, that ‘bundle’ consisted not only of a royalty and
bonus payment, but also just and reasonable terms.” See Idaho Code § 47320. As to deprivation of property, the court held Owners were provided an
opportunity to present their objections in a hearing, and the hearing officer
provided a reason for the decision that was made. “However, the lack of
any explanation as to what would guide the decision of whether the terms
of the integration order were just and reasonable meant that Plaintiffs'
opportunity to be heard was not ‘meaningful,’ as required to satisfy due
process.”
Upstream – State
Alaska
State Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Alaskan Crude Corp., No. S-16308/16407, 2018
WL 4170932 (Alaska Aug. 31, 2018).
Lessee attempted to extend the term of an oil and gas lease by conducting
drilling activities on the last day of the lease. However, in contravention of
the terms of the lease, the Alaska State Department of Natural Resources
(“Department”) informed Lessee two days later that the lease had expired.
Department cured its error by reinstating the lease. Lessee contended that
the Department added unsavory terms in the reinstatement and sought legal
remedy. Department terminated the lease six months later, citing Lessee’s
failure to adequately pursue development. The Supreme Court of Alaska
concluded that Department materially breached the lease by failing to
extend it upon lessee’s continued development, however, Department cured
that breach when it reinstated the lease. The Court overturned the lower
court’s reinstatement of the lease that Department terminated due to a lack
of development. The Court reasoned that while there was a limited time for
Lessee to resume drilling operations, Lessee had chosen to litigate the lease
issues rather than continue developing the resources. The Court agreed with
the Commissioner’s assessment that litigation activities are not “drilling
activities” as required by the lease for retention of drilling rights.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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California
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Conservation, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 729
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Environmental organization (“Organization”) sought mandamus against
Department, requiring immediate closure of oil and gas wells that were
injecting and polluting underground aquifers, violating the Safe Drinking
Water Act (“SDWA”). SDWA protects potential sources of drinking water,
including underground aquifers. One way SDWA provides this protection is
through required, statewide programs that control underground injection.
Injections may be permitted within the state plan. Mandamus compels an
agency to perform a ministerial act that corrects past actions or abuses of
discretion; however, mandamus cannot compel an agency to perform a
ministerial action in a specific way. For an act to be ministerial, it must be
required and its processes governed by a legal authority. EPA and
Department, pursuant to SDWA, administered the State’s program that
controlled underground injection, the cause of the aquifer pollution. Later,
Department did not comply with the plan. Upon receipt of a letter from
EPA, Department implemented a corrective action plan, which was
essentially a nonsubstantial revision of the original plan. The corrective
plan allowed limited injection into aquifers that could potentially be a
source of drinking water, but only until February of 2017; however,
injections continued after that date. Certain permitted oil and gas wells were
injecting into potential underground drinking sources. Given these
extraordinary circumstances with permit discrepancies, Department and
EPA conducted an interest balancing test and chose to continue the
injections. Under SDWA, Department had the duty to protect aquifers and
not endanger potential drinking sources, but Department retained its
discretion in how best to carry out that task. The Court held that SDWA did
not require Department to immediately stop the fluid injections into
groundwater aquifers.
Kansas
LCL, LLC, v. Fallen, 390 P.3d 571 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
Company filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to its one-half interest in
mineral rights. Owners filed a counterclaim also seeking to quiet title.
Owners and Company settled quiet title, but Owners filed a lawsuit against
Third Party for negligence, breach of implied contract, and breach of
fiduciary duty. Third Party sought summary judgment based on statute of
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limitations. On the claim of negligence, which alleged that Third Party
negligently filed and recorded sale of property by not excluding the interest
in mineral rights in the sale, the court found that the Owners did not suffer
substantial injury until they stopped receiving royalty payments due to
them. Because the loss of royalty payments did not begin until 2014,
Owners were not barred by the statute of limitations and had an actionable
injury for a negligence claim. Breach of implied contract was definitively
barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim for the
breach of fiduciary duty was not barred by the statute of limitations,
because it did not rise until 2014 when Owner stopped receiving royalty
payments. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the court’s ruling.
Ohio
Am. Energy-Utica, LLC v. Fuller, No. 17 CA 000028, 2018 WL 3868119,
2018-Ohio-3250.
Gas Company asserted that the Maryland Public Service Commission
(“Commission”), the circuit court for Montgomery County, and the court of
special appeals erred in their statutory analyses related to distribution
pipeline projects. Commission regulates public service companies,
including Gas Company. Commission may order an adjustment of a public
service company’s rates if the income they receive year deviates from the
prior year. The STRIDE statute allowed the recovery of reasonable and
prudent costs of investments so long as Commission approves the
investments. Gas Company filed a STRIDE plan to recover costs for
investing in the pipeline system. However, the lower courts did not agree
that Gas Company should recover for the investments in pipeline that are
not located in the state of Maryland because the STRIDE statute only
applies to in-state projects. The court found the plain language of the statute
to be unambiguous in providing that costs can be recovered for projects
located in the state of Maryland. According to the court, to disregard the
clear language would violate the basic principles of statutory interpretation.
Moreover, the legislative intent, although not required, aids in determining
that the recovery costs only apply to projects in the state of Maryland.
Looking at the documents of the bill, the court determined the sole focus
was on projects within the state of Maryland.
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Am. Water Mgmt. Serv., LLC v. Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt., No. 17AP145, 2018 WL 3640989, 2018-Ohio-3028.
Company appealed orders from Agency requiring Company to shut in
injection wells. The orders were issued due to alleged induced seismicity
from the use of the wells. The Court of Common Pleas found the Agency’s
decision unreasonable because there had been a reasonable plan submitted
for the reinstatement of wells that had not been considered. The Agency
then appealed the Court of Common Pleas’ decision to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Agency while
holding that the trial court lacked authority to issue an order requiring
Agency to perform certain duties. The court reasoned that under the Ohio
Constitution and statute, the Court of Common Pleas could take any action
that the Agency could and that some of their holdings could not have
originally been promulgated by the Agency and were therefore
inappropriate.
Texas
Allen Drilling Acquisition Co. v. Crimson Expl. Inc., No. 10-15-00277-CV,
2018 WL 3944676 (Tex. App. Aug. 15, 2018).
Oil Company 1 (“Company 1”) brought action against Oil Company 2
(“Company 2”) alleging breach of an agreement related to development of
oil and gas interests in two counties. Company 2 brought a counterclaim for
breach of the same agreement. Trial court entered judgment for Company 1
and Company 2 appealed. The appeal involved the interpretation of a series
of agreements relating to the interests. The appellate court made the
following findings that resulted in the court affirming in part and reversing
in part the decision of the trial court who erred in its interpretations of the
agreements. First, initial agreements were not superseded by subsequent
agreements, because “even if subsequent agreements contained a merger
clause, the merger clause does not supersede the initial joint operating
agreement.” Second, the Original Joint Operating Agreement (“Original
JOA”) was not limited to the original formation but could include
subsequent formations, because if the parties desired to impose a depth
restriction on the properties acquired under the Area of Mutual Interest
(“AMI”), they could do so and should have used explicit language that
specifically limited the JOA and the AMI to the original formation. Third,
Company 2’s breach of contract counterclaim relating to leases Company 1
excluded Company 2 from are barred by the statute of limitations. Fourth,
“the trial court erred in dismissing Company 2’s breach of contract claim
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relating to participation in subsequent leases under the Original JOA AMI.”
The error was the result of the interpretation of the scope of the agreements
and the strength of one agreement against another. Lastly, “Company 2 is in
default under the [second] JOA, and Company 1 is entitled to exercise its
remedies of suspension and foreclosure under the [second] JOA, though
there is a fact issue remaining as to the amount of the default.”
Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., No. 07-17-00112-CV, 2018 WL 3596744
(Tex. App. July 26, 2018).
The trial court found that an “anti-washout” clause within a mineral
assignment did not extend to new leases. Successors in interest appealed.
The “anti-washout” clause was drafted to ensure that an overriding royalty
interest, benefiting Successors, survived if the original lease was altered or
expired. When the original lease expired, Operator’s top lease became
effective. Operator refused to pay on Successor’s overriding interest, and
Successor brought suit. The trial court found that the “anti-washout” clause
did not extend to the new top lease, Successor appealed, and the Court of
Appeals of Texas, Amarillo affirmed. The court interpreted the clause,
ruling that the extension of the interest would only trigger if there was a
renewal or extension of the original lease, or if a new lease was executed on
the same minerals. The court ruled that a top lease was not an extension or
renewal of the original lease, but was a new lease altogether. The court then
analyzed whether or not an “anti-washout” clause could attach to a new
lease. The court found that the clause violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities. In Texas, “no interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all,
within twenty-one years after the death of some life or lives in being at the
time of conveyance.” Two parts of the clause contained contingencies of
indefinite nature. First, the triggering of the clause was determinate on the
expiration of the original lease. The original lease was to survive for as long
as the minerals produced in economic quantities—in theory, the minerals
could have produced for an infinite amount of time. Second, the “antiwashout” clause would attach the overriding royalty interest to any new
lease covering the minerals in question. A new lease could have been
executed over the minerals an indefinite amount of time after the expiration
of the original lease. The court found that these two contingencies of
indefinite nature violated the Rule Against Perpetuities and that the creation
of an overriding royalty interest in the new lease was invalid. The court also
affirmed the trial court’s decision to refuse to reform the clause.
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Midstream – Federal
3d Cir.
Twp. of Bordentown v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 903 F.3d 234 (3d
Cir. 2018).
Township brought suit against FERC to combat the expansion of interstate
natural gas pipeline facilities operated by Pipe Line Company
(“Company”). Township claimed FERC arbitrarily and capriciously
approved Company’s project, violating several federal statutes governing
approval and construction of such pipelines and other federal environmental
protection laws. Township also alleged State Department of Environmental
Protection (“Department”) violated state law by improperly issuing permits
and denying Township a hearing to challenge their issuance. Township
claims that FERC knowingly issued a certificate for Company to conduct
activity before obtaining the state permit, which Company was required to
obtain first under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Because FERC issued the
certificate on the condition that Company obtain the necessary state permit
before engaging in construction, there was no violation of the CWA.
Township claimed FERC was required to exert jurisdiction over the
pipeline project or that absent jurisdiction, FERC must perform a
cumulative analysis on the environmental impact of the project. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that FERC properly addressed the potential
impacts and FERC’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction was
correct. Township also claimed FERCA violated NEPA with its treatment
regarding the well impacts. However, the court disagreed. Township also
challenged the need for the project and whether there was good faith notice,
both lines of which the court rejected. None of Township’s numerous
challenges to FERC’s approval survived. The Third Circuit did determine
that Department misinterpreted the state regulation governing the hearing to
challenge the permits and, therefore, should not have denied Township’s
request for a permit. Department interpreted the NGA to mean that the
federal Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction regarding any
challenges to final decisions granting permits and the Department’s
provisions for preliminary adjudicatory hearings were thus preempted. The
Third Circuit remanded, requiring Department to fulfill Township’s request
for a hearing.
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4th Cir.
Sierra Club, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
2018).
Conservation Organization brought suit, seeking a review of decisions
made by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and the United States
Forest Service ("USFR"). These decisions concerned a right of way granted
to the Operator of an oil and gas pipeline through federal lands. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals may set aside a federal agency's action if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." In reviewing USFR's adoption of a sedimentary analysis in its
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), the court found that BLM acted
arbitrarily and capriciously. Initially, USFR had expressed concerns over
how Operator had overestimated the reduction of sediment its proposed
containment measures would yield. Despite these concerns never being
addressed, the USFR still adopted the EIS containing the projections.
Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 896 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018).
On the route of a proposed natural gas pipeline, Landowners brought an
action against the project and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”), among several others. The primary basis of the suit was a
constitutional challenge to the eminent domain provision of the Natural Gas
Act (“NGA”) as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. FERC filed a motion
to dismiss on the basis of the NGA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, and
that Congress intended to divest the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion without considering the
merits of Plaintiff’s claim, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, citing the implicit divestment of the district court according to
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
This case has been docketed for a Petition for Certiorari by Orus Ashby
Berkley v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Oct. 30, 2018).
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Downstream – Federal
9th Cir.
Arandell Corp. v. Centerpoint Energy Serv., Inc., 900 F.3d 623 (9th Cir.
2018).
Consumers of natural gas brought suit against Company for its alleged
knowledge of its parent company’s price-fixing scheme. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Company and the Consumers
appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court.
The circuit court explained that it was possible, based off of Supreme Court
precedent, for a subsidiary to be liable based off of a parent company’s
misconduct. However, the court held, that there remained a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether or not Company knew about the price-fixing
scheme.
Downstream – State
Colorado
Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2018 COA 134, 2018 WL 4225030.
Mineral lessees (“Lessees”) appealed the trial court’s order denying motion
for a preliminary injunction to prevent Special District (“District”) from
taxing oil and gas produced from the mineral estate underlying an
approximately 13,000-acre tract (“Tract”) by Lessees. On appeal, Lessees
raised three challenges to District’s taxing authority: (1) under Colorado
statute, the severed mineral estate underlying the 13,000-acre tract could
not be included within District because “all the owners and lessees of that
estate did not petition for and consent to inclusion”; (2) by including Tract
within its boundaries to further its regional operations, District “modified
its service plan, but did not obtain statutorily required approval from the
board of county commissioners (“BOCC”) in each of the affected
counties”; and (3) by including Tract within its boundaries, District violated
Colorado statute, because its services overlapped with those of another
district. As to the third challenge, the appellate court held that the question
of whether services overlapped was not properly before the court. As to the
first challenge, the appellate court found mineral estate owners to be “fee
owners” under the statute, but owners of severed mineral estates – in this
case, the Lessees – were not. Therefore, District did not need to show
consent of all Lessees for inclusion in the special district, and District’s
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taxing authority was not invalidated on that basis. The appellate court thus
affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment as to Lessees’ claim.
As to Lessee’s second challenge, the trial court’s order denying Lessees'
motion for a preliminary injunction was vacated based on Lessees’ “ability
to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits as to whether
District statute by failing to obtain BOCC approval, thereby precluding
District from being able to tax lessee.”
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Kentucky
Nami Res. Co., LLC v. Asher Land & Mineral, LTD., 554 S.W.3d 323 (Ky.
2018).
Lessor brought action against Lessee asserting Lessee violated its
contractual obligations by fraudulently underpaying royalties owed under
the leases that governed Lessee’s processing of the gas, and the market
price for which gas was ultimately sold. Lessor’s claims were brought
under theories of breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation of the
factors that determine the amount of royalties owed to Lessor. Following a
jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Lessor for over $1.3
million in compensatory damages and over $2.6 million in punitive
damages. Lessee appealed and Lessor promptly cross-appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and the case then went
before the Supreme Court of Kentucky for discretionary review. The Court
affirmed the award for compensatory damages, because Lessor adequately
proved the breach of contract claim through evidence and expert testimony
that supported a jury finding that Lessees’ royalty payments were
unreasonable or miscalculated. While the Court affirmed the compensatory
damages, it reversed the punitive damages. Case law in Kentucky states
“when a plaintiff may obtain complete relief for his contractual losses by
means of compensatory damages under a breach of contract claim, even
when the breach is motivated by malice and accomplished through fraud, he
may not simultaneously recover punitive damages after being made whole
on his contractual damages.” Upon application of the foregoing, the Court
found Lessor was made whole through its compensatory damages award for
unpaid royalties. Additionally, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s
rulings that: (1) post-verdict motions were timely, (2) no errors committed
during the trial warrant a setting aside of the verdict and the granting of a
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new trial, and (3) the trial court properly denied Lessor’s motion to amend
its complaint based on procedural grounds.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
4th Cir.
Sierra Club v. State Water Control Bd., 898 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2018).
State certified that Project would not degrade State’s water. Environmental
Advocates petitioned for review. The court found that State was allowed to
regulate Project under the Clean Water Act. Such regulation must assure
that “the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate
applicable water quality standards.” State was required to consider the
general water quality criterion and anti-degradation policy. State
determined that Project would not permanently affect surface waters and
would restore surface waters through State’s recommendations. The court
found that Environmental Advocates had standing because they could trace
injury-in-fact to the certification that State issued and that there was a
“realistic possibility” that Environmental Advocates could be granted relief.
The court also found that State had sufficient basis to find that water quality
would not be adversely, permanently affected, and therefore had not acted
arbitrarily in certifying Project. Court denied the petitions.
5th Cir.
Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2018).
Owner of property brought suit challenging a Texas City’s (“City”) use of a
drain and sewage system consisting of an open ditch running through
Owner’s property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
City. The primary issues presented upon appeal were (1) whether City had
acquired an easement on the property, and (2) whether the system
constituted a physical taking under the Fifth Amendment. In regard to
whether City had acquired an easement to the property, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that substantial factual issues existed that precluded
summary judgement on this claim. Specifically, the court found that there
were issues as to whether the preceding owner of the property allowed the
city to drain water through his property creating an implied easement.
Further, issues of fact existed as to whether the preceding owner of the
property intended to assume any risk from the storm sewer that would
preclude Owner’s claims. Finally, the court held that Owner was aware of
the potential damage to his property which began the statute of limitations
for when he could file a claim and was thus time-barred by its expiration at
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the time of suit. As a result, the court dismissed the Fifth Amendment
taking claim.
9th Cir.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2018).
Environmentalists challenged the findings of Fish and Wildlife Services
(“FWS”) that did not classify the Arctic Grayling as endangered or
threatened. Environmentalists argued that FWS used an incorrect definition
of “range” resulting in its exclusion from the endangered or threatened
categories. The district court held in favor of FWS on a summary judgment
motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Environmentalists
believed that the definition of “range” should include the Grayling’s
historical range, which Environmentalists believed would prompt its
inclusion on endangered or threatened lists. Through a Chevron analysis,
the Ninth Circuit determined that the word “range” in the Endangered
Species Act was ambiguous. The Ninth Circuit then determined that the
FWS exclusion of the Grayling was arbitrary and capricious for a variety of
reasons including: (1) ignoring decreasing numbers; (2) failing to explain
its belief in a cold water refuge in Big Hole River; (3) failing to consider
the effects of climate change; and (4) conducting too short of a study to
determine the viability of the Ruby River population. The Ninth Circuit
therefore reversed the holding of the district court because FWS failed to
consider the relevant factors and articulate a rational connection between
those factors and the decision it reached. The issue was remanded to FWS
to reconsider the listing of the Grayling in accordance with the findings.
Fed. Cir.
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States, 900 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Native American Tribe (“Tribe”) filed an action against the United States
claiming it was entitled to monetary damages and injunctive relief from the
alleged taking of its water rights and the alleged mismanagement of Tribe’s
water by the United States. The court found that Tribe’s water rights were
based wholly on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Winters v. United
States, which stated that Indian Reservations carry implied rights to water
“to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” 207
U.S. 564 (1908). However, the U.S. filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
Tribe lacked standing to sue. The Federal Circuit found that in light of
Winters, the scope of the water rights depends on Tribe’s need for the
water, and here, Tribe had not alleged that the amount of water flowing into
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the reservation and available for use was insufficient for its purpose. By
extension, the court found that Tribe had failed to allege an injury in fact
and therefore granted the motion to dismiss based on lack of standing to
sue.
State
California
Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Foundation asked the court to determine whether the public trust doctrine
applied to groundwater, and if so, whether the legislature replaced them
with the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”). The
issue was whether the SGMA replaces or crystalizes “the common law duty
to consider the public trust interests before allowing groundwater extraction
that potentially harms a navigable waterway.” The lower court found that
the public trust doctrine did apply to groundwater connected to the public
resources of the Scott River, the County had to consider the public trust
when giving permits for groundwater wells, and County’s common law
public trust duties didn’t conflict with the SGMA. County appealed whether
Board actually had a duty and authority to regulate groundwater extraction,
and whether such a duty under the public trust doctrine even existed. The
court rejected County’s claim that the public trust doctrine should not apply
to non-navigable groundwater, because groundwater extraction that
negatively affects the public trust waters of the Scott River is, indirectly,
part of the public trust. The court also rejected the idea that the reasonable
use doctrine overrides the public trust doctrine, because the Supreme Court
held in a previous case that different standards can exist simultaneously.
The court also held that Board had the authority to “protect the public trust”
and not be limited by the confines of the Board’s license and permit
authority. The court rejected County’s assertion that the SGMA occupied
the field of law and supplanted the public trust, because the SGMA did not
completely cover the issues of groundwater in its terms. The court held that
there was no violation of the separation of powers, because there was no
apparent legislative intent to supersede the public trust doctrine in the
SGMA. The court affirmed the lower decision.
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Washington
Puget Soundkeeper All. v. State, 424 P.3d 1173 (Wash. 2018).
Alliance challenged Ecology’s issuance of a permit to a company for
discharging waste water on an issue with the testing practice required by the
permit. Alliance challenged the amount of PCB allowed and wanted
Ecology to use the more sensitive test 1668C to check for compliance on
the limits of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCB”) in the waste water, as
opposed to Ecology’s Method 608 test. The Pollution Control Hearings
Board ruled that Ecology could ask the EPA to approve use of rule 1668C
but did not have to, because Method 608 was the only test presently
approved by the EPA. Alliance appealed and the court of appeals affirmed
the Board’s ruling. Alliance appealed again to the Supreme Court of
Washington, claiming that the testing under regulation WAC 173-201A260(3)(h), Method 608, was insufficient to test for PBC water quality
standards required under statute RCW 90.48.520, thus requiring use of
Method 1668C. Review of the Board’s decision was carried out de novo.
The Court rejected the arguments of Alliance, because the Court held that
the EPA standard only required a “sufficiently sensitive” test for water
discharge permits and Method 608 was such a “sufficiently sensitive” test.
The relevant statute required a test to be known, available, and reliable. The
Court held that Method 1668C was an unreliable test, because it could not
determine the source of PBCs and was not EPA approved. The only other
way for Method 1668C to be used was if it was a superseding test, which
the Court held that it was not, because the EPA published Method 1668C to
be used in conjunction with other water quality tests. The Court held that a
supplementary test cannot usurp a normal test, like Method 608. The Court
held for Ecology and affirmed the Board and appellate court decisions.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Federal
N.D. California
Geysers Dev. P’ship v. Geysers Power Co., LLC, No. 17-cv-06834-WHO,
2018 WL 3730129 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018).
Developer brought action to enforce and clarify an easement within the
largest geothermal energy field in the world. Developer owns the property,
while Power Company holds a 99-year lease to develop and extract steam
to generate electricity. Both parties filed for summary judgment to resolve
whether the easement is unfettered access or merely purposes related to
electrical generation and maintenance, particularly what rights Partnership
retained and what rights Power Company held. The court granted
Partnership’s motion and denied Power Company’s, holding that
Partnership may restrict third party access to the site and prevent the use of
facilities on the property from being used to process steam generated offsite.
This case has since been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but there is no
decision from the higher court as of publication.
State
Connecticut
City of Hartford v. CBV Parking Hartford, LLC, 192 A.3d 406 (Conn.
2018).
City, in an attempt to beautify its downtown area, used eminent domain to
purchase several pieces of property being used as parking lots. Owner of
the property sued the city and claimed the property had been improperly
valued, citing the increased utility of the land as a result of the development
of a minor league baseball stadium adjacent to the lots. The lower court
increased the value of the property by approximately $3 million with an
interest rate of 7.22 percent. City appealed, contending that the lower court
improperly valued the property and exceeded its authority in awarding
interest. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the valuation but
overturned the award of interest. The Court dismissed City’s argument that
the lower court used the wrong test for valuation. The Court found that the
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lower court was reasonable in its valuation of the property on the belief that
City would combine the lots with others to be used in its upscale
development of the neighborhood. The Court found, however, that the
lower court exceeded its authority in awarding an interest rate of 7.22
percent. Connecticut statute demands the method of calculating interest in
eminent domain suits as the “weekly average one-year constant maturity
yield of United States Treasury securities . . . for the calendar week
preceding the date of taking.” Thus, the Court affirmed the valuation of the
property but remanded the issue of interest to be decided in line with
statutory guidelines.
Kentucky
C.W. Hoskins Heirs v. Wells, 2017-SC-000004-DG, 2018 WL 3914711
(Ky. Aug. 16, 2018).
Owner brought suit against Lessee, alleging that Lessee did not pay coal
royalties. Lessee brought adjacent landowners (“Adjacent”) into the action
to determine whose land the coal was on. Owner and Adjacent had the
burden to establish the location of the boundary line between their lands.
The lower court used Owner’s survey to determine the boundary line rather
than Adjacent’s because Adjacent’s surveyor did not consider surrounding
deeds, which is a violation of a surveyor’s standards of practice. Finding in
favor of Owner’s property line, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
Owner was entitled to Lessee’s coal royalties.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New Jersey
Seaside Heights Borough Pub. Beach v. Seaside Heights Borough &
AFMV, Inc., Nos. A-4585-15T3, A-5372-15T3, A-0557-16T4, 2018 WL
3614590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 30, 2018).
Three Parties appealed decisions made by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (“DEP”). The DEP decisions approved plans to
convey a beach parcel to a pier owner in exchange for other parcels of
property. Parties argued that the DEP did not have the authority to approve
the conveyance under state statute. The Superiors State Court affirmed the
decisions of the DEP. The court explained that the replacement land in the
conveyance was “reasonably equivalent” as a whole, the fair market value
of the replacement land exceeded that of the beach parcel, and the required
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replacement ratio of 1:4 was far exceeded. The court further held that
certain policy decisions had been appropriately made by the DEP in
consideration of the transaction.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Oregon
Cascadia Wildlands v. Oregon Dep’t of State Lands, 427 P.3d 1091 (Or. Ct.
App. 2018).
Environmental Group filed suit challenging the sale of a parcel of land by
the Oregon Department of State Lands (“ODSL”) to Timber Company.
Previously, the trial court held that Environmental Group lacked standing to
sue and dismissed the claim without reaching the merits of the case.
However, on appeal, the court found that under Oregon law, standing is
based on a statutory source, in this case ORS 183.480, which allows anyone
with aggrieved interest to have standing. In this case, one of the members of
the Environmental Group alleged that he was no longer able to enjoy the
forest and was thus aggrieved. The court agreed, and thereby determined
that since a member of Environmental Group was aggrieved, they had
standing. Given that Environmental Group had standing, and that the record
was fully developed, it proceeded to the merits of the case. Environmental
Group posited that the sale of the parcel was prohibited by ORS 530.450.
ODSL did not contest that the sale was prohibited but chose to argue that
the statute itself was unconstitutional under the Oregon Constitution.
However, the court found that the plain text of the statute was intended to
prevent this exact situation and that it was constitutional. As a result, the
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Washington
Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cty., 423 P.3d 223 (Wash.
2018).
Company sued County for interference, negligent misrepresentation and a §
1983 due process violation. Company received the property and permit to
mine from a prior occupant of the property and faced several challenges
from environmental groups over its mining operation. Company agreed to
mine a significantly reduced amount and reclaim the property after
obtaining the reduced amount. Under pressure from concerned groups,
County insisted upon additional environmental testing not stipulated by the
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State, and Company complied. After completing the testing, County
insisted upon adjusting the permit formally and hold a hearing before
mining would start. The Washington Supreme Court held that there was
sufficient evidence to uphold the § 1983 action, that Company’s property
rights were violated, that there was tortious interference, and that Company
was not entitled to attorney’s fees.
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Traditional Generation
9th Cir.
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 903 F.3d 862
(9th Cir. 2018).
California Districts (“Districts”) challenged FERC’s decision denying their
complaint against Gas and Electric Company (“Company”) for breach of
agreement. The California Department of Water Resources (“Department”)
entered into a contract with Company for Company to provide Department
with various services. Company then entered into an Interconnection
Agreement (“Agreement”) with Others, providing the terms of the
operations. Department had such large power needs, so it participated in a
Remedial Action Scheme (“RAS”) to manage the system. Before the
contract was set to terminate, Department notified Company it would cease
the RAS. Districts approached the State and Company regarding potential
Adverse Impact of the loss of the RAS on their systems. Company
disagreed with Districts’ concerns, so Districts filed a complaint against
Company. FERC decided a reprogramming of the RAS “was not likely” to
have an Adverse Impact on the Districts’ Systems. Districts appealed. The
issue depended on the interpretation of “Adverse Impact” in the Agreement.
FERC concluded that “Adverse Impact” only applied to material
degradation of a system’s reliability, but did not consider the second
alternate definition, which applies to reductions in import capabilities.
Because FERC too narrowly interpreted the meaning of Adverse Impact,
FERC’s orders were arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that
FERC used an incorrect standard in evaluating Districts’ request under the
Agreement for a study on the impact of the RAS reprogramming. The court
remanded for further proceedings, ordering FERC to use the broader
definition of Adverse Impact and the proper standard for requesting a study
on whether Company breached the Agreement by reprogramming the RAS
and reducing the import capabilities of Districts’ Systems.
Massachusetts
New England Power Generators Ass’n v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 105 N.E.3d
1156 (Mass. 2018).
Energy Companies (“Companies”) assert that State overstepped its
authority with an Act that (1) imposes decreasing greenhouse gas emission
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limits on State’s electric sector, (2) will actually increase Statewide
emissions, and (3) contains a sunset provision prohibiting regulations after
2020. The Act has two relevant provisions regarding the allegation that
State exceeded its authority. The first, § 3(c), allows the executive office
and department to control emissions of the electric sector. The second, §
3(d), generally allows for regulations to establish a declining level of
aggregate emissions for all sources. Companies argue that the existence of
the § 3(c) targeted provision exempts the electric sector from § 3(d). The
court determined that the two provisions are complements, and the electric
sector is not exempt from regulations created under § 3(d)’s authority.
Therefore, State has the authority to create regulations under § 3(d) that
establish emission caps on the energy industry. The Court determined that
the regulatory scheme for emission reduction includes provisions that
would counter the possibility of outsourcing electricity, resulting in an
increase of emissions outside of the state. Most significantly, the
regulations require electricity providers to obtain increasing amounts of
clean-energy-sourced electricity each year. Lastly, the Court did not
interpret the sunset provision, which required regulations to expire at the
end of 2020, to mean the entire State’s authority of the statute also expired.
The Court interpreted the text in light of the entire regulatory scheme and
determined just the current provisions would expire, but State would still
have the authority to create new regulations under § 3(d).
Vermont
In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 2018 VT 97, 2018 WL 4266393.
Renewable Energy Company (“Company-1”) appealed the Vermont Public
Utility Commission’s (“PUC”) denial to intervene as a party in proceedings
concerning whether Power Company (“Company-2”) could purchase power
generation facilities from outside the state. PUC granted several certificates
of public goods (“CPGs”) to Company-2, allowing it to purchase out-ofstate power facilities. Company-1 sought intervention, claiming it had a
right to do so as (1) it has a substantial interest which might be adversely
affected, (2) there are no alternative proceedings to protect that interest, and
(3) its interests are not already adequately represented. PUC denied
Company-1’s motion to intervene for lack of a “substantial, particularized
interest,” as Company-1 had no interest that separated itself from any other
ratepayer that might be affected from a change in electricity rates as a result
of the CPGs. While the PUC’s rule does not explicitly require a
“particularized” interest, the Court must give enormous consideration to the
PUC’s application of its own rules. Thus, the Court deferred to the PUC’s
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interpretation. Company-1 also had no substantial interest from its status as
a competitor that would require the PUC to join Company-1 to the CPG
proceedings. The Court determined that, absent any substantial interest, the
PUC properly denied Company-1’s motion to intervene. The Court also
dismissed Company-1’s appeal of the CPG grants.
Renewable Generation
Fed. Cir.
Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, 897 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
This dispute between Government and Windfarm Owners (“Owners”)
centered around the proper method of calculating cash grants for certain
renewable energy facilities under the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act. Owners used the “unallocated method” of calculation, which
calculated the allocable amount as the difference between the purchase
price and grant-ineligible tangible property. The Government contended the
“residual method” of § 1060 of the Internal Revenue Code was proper: the
purchase price less the grant-ineligible tangible property must then be
allocated between grant-eligible tangible personal property and grantineligible intangibles. Owners argued that intangibles, such as goodwill,
could not exist as the facilities were not operational when Owners
purchased them. The court determined that the residual method was proper,
as the purchases constituted an “active trade or business. . . to which
goodwill or going concern value could. . . attach.” The mere possibility of
the existence of goodwill and other intangible assets required the use of the
residual method. The court relied on the existence of transmission rights,
the possibility of goodwill accruing through contracts, and customer
relationships, as evidence of potential intangibles.
Rate
D.C. Cir.
Util. Workers Union of Am. Local 464 v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
896 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Union brought suit against Agency after the closure of a coal-fired
electrical plant. The closure was announced immediately before the annual
forward capacity auction (“FCA”), without enough time for other large
electricity suppliers to supplant the deficit caused by the closure, and Union
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argued this resulted in a spike in the auction price to the detriment of
electricity customers. Union attempted to challenge the closure through
Commission, but the FCA auction went into effect before Commission
ruled. Union brought essentially the same suit in the subsequent two FCAs,
continuing the same argument that the closure manipulated market prices to
an unfairly high rate. Agency submitted a motion for summary judgment on
direct review, which was granted. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Union could not prove proximate causation between the closure of the
plant and the harm in the subsequent years, and that any injury caused in
the year of the closure lacked an appropriate remedy.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
2d Cir.
Cooling Water Intake Structure Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 905 F.3d 49
(2d Cir. 2018).
Suit consolidating four petitions: (1) challenging a Final Rule concerning
entrainment and impingement requirements for cooling water intake
structures under § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) as arbitrary and
capricious and in conflict with provisions of the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”); (2) challenging the same Final Rule as going beyond the authority
given to the EPA under the CWA, that Final Rule’s primary supporting
biological opinion was erroneous, and that the EPA did not engage in
sufficient notice and comment under the APA; (3) challenging the Final
Rule as insufficient under APA notice and comment requirements by
defining “new units” of cooling water intake structures so vaguely as to not
provide actual notice; (4) arguing that EPA’s Final Rule was arbitrary and
capricious by applying these standards to intake structures that do not draw
water for the purpose of cooling. The Second Circuit concluded that in
relation to the first and second petition, the Final Rule was sufficiently
supported by the evidence and within the CWA and ESA. In the case of the
third petition, the court stated the EPA rationally narrowed the Final Rule
after notice and comment, which they are encouraged to do. The court also
rejected the final petition as baseless.
4th Cir.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018).
Organization challenged Department’s decisions pertaining to the approval
of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline pursuant to the Endangered Species Act and
the Mineral Leasing Act. The Organization, specifically, challenged the
authorization of an incidental take statement which allowed for the kill or
harm of five species on the endangered or threatened list, and the decision
to allow a right of way through the Blue Ridge Parkway. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the Department’s decisions were arbitrary
and capricious, and vacated the Department’s decisions. The court reasoned
that the decision granting the right of way lacked an explanation
demonstrating the pipeline’s consistency with the purposes of the Parkway,
as required under the Blue Ridge Parkway Organic Act, and that the
incidental take statement set vague and unenforceable limits.
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Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2018).
Group brought action against Company, alleging Company’s liability for
introducing arsenic pollution from ash storage in settling ponds. The action
commenced years after Company had first become aware of high pollutant
levels and entered into a corrective action plan with Agency, a state entity.
Group alleged that Company was in violation of the Clean Waters Act
(“CWA”) by allowing pollution from “point sources,” as well as two
conditions of discharge permits Company obtained as part of its corrective
action plan with Agency. The lower court found Company in violation of
the CWA but deferred to the Agency’s understanding that Company had
not violated the discharge permits. Both parties appealed, and the appellate
court held for Company in both respects. The court noted that a CWA
violation turned on the definition of “point source,” as the CWA was
strictly limited to pollutants discharging from such sources, and that other
environmental protection laws, such as the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), contemplated restrictions on other sources of
pollution. The appellate court noted that the term “conveyance” was
essential to understanding a point source, and that the carefully defined
terms of the CWA constrained its applicability. Under that understanding,
settling ponds were not point sources, as they allow diffuse seepage and
therefore distribution but do not convey a pollutant as a pipe or channel
would. The distinction removed Company’s settling ponds from CWA
liability. The court noted that RCRA still applied to Company’s obligations,
and therefore Company was still directed to manage the pollutants.
However, the discharge permits at question were obtained from Agency in
compliance with RCRA. Therefore, Company remained responsible for
pollutants, Agency’s determination that the discharge permits were not to
be understood via a CWA analysis was appropriate, and Company was not
in violation of the CWA.
9th Cir.
Bohmker v. Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2018).
State passed a law that placed a temporary moratorium on in-stream
mining, in an effort to protect indigenous fish species and improve their
habitat. Miners with claims on federal lands challenged the law on
preemption grounds three months before it went into effect. The lower court
granted State’s motion for summary judgment finding that the regulation
was reasonable and not preempted. State then repealed and replaced the
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temporary moratorium with a permanent ban in areas deemed essential
salmon habitat. Miners appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
surveyed federal law on the issue of mining on federal lands determining
that while the federal government intended to encourage mining and
stewardship of the minerals it did not intend to do so at the expense of the
environment and wildlife. The court determined that State’s legislation was
not preempted by the theory of field preemption nor was it by conflict
preemption. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Judge
Smith delivered a passionate dissent saying that he would reverse the lower
court’s decision either on the theory of field preemption or under his belief
that State’s restriction is so severe that it is de facto land use plan.
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018).
Tribes brought a CERCLA action against State and Company for the
dumping of waste into the Columbia River. After the trial court entered
judgment in favor of Tribes, Company appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. On appeal, Company asserted it had provided a sufficient
defense of divisibility. The court noted that CERCLA liability is usually
joint and several, but on rare occasions can be apportioned if the damage is
shown to be divisible. The divisibility analysis involves two steps. First, the
court determined whether or not the environmental damages could be
theoretically apportioned. Then the court determined if the record provided
a "reasonable basis" to apportion liability. At both steps, the party asserting
the defense bears the burden a proof. It is a high burden to meet and
intensely factual, but a preponderance of the evidence standard applies.
Company's expert conducted a study focusing only on the pollutants
Company had released into the river. The study did not consider what other
pollutants were already in the river. The court determined that due to the
study overlooking the possible environmental damages resulting from the
aggregation of toxic chemicals, Company had not met its burden to show
that the damage could have been theoretically apportioned. The court also
found that Company had not met its burden to show that there was a
rational basis for apportionment. Company's methods for apportioning
liability were all volumetric in nature. The court held that volumetric
apportionment methods are only useful when it can be reasonably assumed
that independent factors made no significant effect on the scope of
environmental harm. The court found that a reasonable person would have
to consider geographic and temporal factors when determining the
environmental impact of pollution. The court affirmed the judgment against
Company.
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10th Cir.
Chance v. Zinke, 898 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 2018).
Landowner sued the government for violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Landowner claimed that the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) violated NEPA by granting permits to drill new
wells without conducting required environmental-impact assessments
before approving the drilling permits. The district court dismissed
Landowner’s claim against the government for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to
have the claim dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court explained
that Landowner’s claims were untimely due to the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations and, thus, dismissal for failure to state a
claim was appropriate.
D.C. Cir.
Boston Delegation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 897 F.3d 241 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
FERC approved a pipeline operator’s (“Operator”) request to upgrade its
pipeline to increase its capacity. Concerned Citizens (“CC”) alleged that
FERC failed to consider safety issues when issuing its permit to Operator.
CC argued that FERC failed to comply with NEPA because it improperly
segmented the project when performing its environmental review and did
not give enough weight to the cumulative environmental impacts of the
pipeline upgrade. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the segmentation
was proper because of the functional and timing uniqueness of the projects
and FERC did not fail to comply with NEPA. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit
held that no violation of NEPA occurred because FERC did adequately
consider the cumulative environmental impacts based on the information
available to the agency at the time of its determination. CC argued that
FERC’s determination that the pipeline upgraded created no additional
safety risk lacked substantial evidence. The D.C. Circuit found FERC’s
determination of no increased safety risk to be supported by substantial
evidence because it properly relied on expert opinion and denied CC
argument. CC finally alleged that the third-party contractor used to
formulate FERC’s environmental impact study had a conflict of interest.
The Court held that despite CC being able to show a conflict of interest,
that the conflict would only invalidate if it destroyed the NEPA process,
which CC could not show. D.C. Circuit denied the petitions under review.
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Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 901 F.3d 414 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
EPA promulgated a final rule governing disposal of coal combustion
residuals (“coal residuals”) pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) which allowed states to regulate coal residuals in
the interim while EPA considered regulating disposal on the federal level
and set minimum criteria for disposing of coal residuals. Environmental
Groups and Industry Groups both petitioned to review the final rule. The
D.C. Circuit allowed EPA’s motion to voluntarily remand some provisions
of the final rule for reconsideration but denied remand on all provisions
currently in dispute by the parties. Environmental Groups challenged
provisions allowing (1) unlined surface impoundments (“USIs”) to continue
operation until they caused ground water contamination, (2) “clay-lined”
surface impoundments to be classified as “lined” and therefore treated the
same as impoundments lined with a geomembrane, and (3) the exemption
of inactive impoundments at inactive facilities (“legacy ponds”) from
current regulations for similar inactive impoundments. The court vacated all
three provisions as arbitrary and capricious because (1) both the responsive
approach of detecting leaks in USIs and EPA’s regulation of “clay-lined”
impoundments did not address and respond to the identified health and
environmental harms and was thus contrary to the requirements of RCRA,
and (2) EPA’s decision to exempt legacy ponds due to difficulties of
identifying responsible parties disregarded the substantial risk posed by
legacy ponds and was contradicted by the record. The court rejected the
Industry Group’s challenges to the final rule, holding that EPA (1) had the
authority to regulate inactive impoundments since RCRA confers EPA
authority over “open dumps”, (2) provided adequate notice to parties on
location requirements for existing impoundments, (3) regulations for
seismic impact zones were not arbitrary and capricious, and (4) did not
have to consider costs when providing alternatives for sites having to close
due to the final rule.
N.D. Alabama
Black Warrior Riverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:17-cv00439-LSC, 2018 WL 3869983 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2018).
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) moved for summary judgment
against Corps, and Corps cross motioned for the same. Company requested
a jurisdictional determination from Corps so that it may expand its mining
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operations. Corps accepted Company’s project proposal and monitored the
progress to ensure Company complied with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). However, Corps did
not require Company to produce an environmental impact statement
(“EIS”), nor did Corps investigate whether or not wildlife would be harmed
from the expansion, concluding that the mining site was too distant from
areas with known endangered species. Advocates claim that Corps
conducted its duties in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner, violating the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in relation to the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”), CWA, and NEPA. For such a claim, the court may
only set aside an agency’s action if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”; if the action was
rational, the court may not set aside the action. If the following criteria
exists, an agency’s decision not to require an EIS is likely not arbitrary: (1)
the agency correctly identified the environmental concern; (2) the agency
considered the concern in a critical light; (3) the agency found that no
significant impact is made and can make a convincing case for that finding;
(4) if there is a significant impact, the agency found that safeguards
sufficiently reduce the impact. The court found for Corps, stating that
Advocates did not file their ESA claim timely, that Corps followed proper
procedure in determining that the project did not need an EIS, and that
Corps correctly assessed the potential harm of the project.
D. Colorado
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2018 WL
3804099 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2018).
Organization challenged Agency’s decision to approve an exception to the
Colorado Roadless Rule (“CRR”). The exception allowed for road
construction on previously protected land. Organization brought action
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The challenge was brought in
conjunction with a dispute over proposed coal exploration and mining
activities. The court affirmed the Agency’s decision. The court explained
that the Agency considered alternatives, and disclosed and considered the
baseline environmental data, as required by NEPA. Further, the court noted
that though NEPA imposes procedural requirements on agencies, it does
not determine the substantial conclusion reached by agencies.
This case has since been appealed to the Tenth Circuit, but there is no
decision from the higher court as of publication
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Rocky Mountain Peace & Justice Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 18CV-01017-PAB, 2018 WL 3772864 (D. Colo. Aug. 9, 2018).
Organization appealed the administrative decisions of the Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”). Organization sought preliminary injunctive relief against the
construction of rerouted trails and the allowance of public access to trails at
the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge. The Refuge was located near a
decommissioned nuclear processing facility. Organization claimed that
FWS’s administrative decisions would pose irreparable harm to
Organization members. Particularly, Organization argued that the
disturbance of the soil would likely result in harm to Organization
members. The court denied Organization’s motion for injunctive relief
holding that they had failed to meet the burden of proof. The court
explained that the Organization was burdened to at least show that there
was no standard safe level of exposure to plutonium and that the
administrative action may exasperate the risk of exposure.
M.D. Florida
Sierra Club, Inc. v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 320 F.Supp.3d
1298 (M.D. Fla. 2018).
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) brought suit against the water
management district (“District”) and Corps, alleging that permitting the
development of part of an embankment violated the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the National
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”). As long as an agency’s actions
were rational and followed an established procedure, those actions will not
be considered arbitrary under APA standards. The court may not review the
agency’s actions with the benefit of hindsight; such determinations must be
made in light of the circumstances in existence at the time of the action or
decision. District and Corps followed established procedures regarding the
permission to develop and reduce the size of the bank; CWA even outlines
the process for granting such permission. State agencies, like District, have
the ability under CWA to regulate their own waters. The court granted
District’s motion for summary judgment because Advocates failed to show
that permitting development of the bank and allowing a reduction of the
bank’s size violated CWA, or APA and NEPA subsequently.
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D. Idaho
W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No.: 1:18-cv-00187-REB, 2018 WL
4550396 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2018).
Organization brought action against BLM, challenging BLM’s instruction
memorandum. The court found that Organization had standing because
members of Organization showed that they “frequently and extensively
utilize the areas where oil and gas leases overlap with sage-grouse habitats
and populations.” Because Organization showed personal stake in the
controversy, it had properly established standing. Further, Organization’s
request for injunctive relief was found to be ripe because BLM’s actions
cause specific hardships to Organization. The court also found that
Organization was likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. BLM’s
actions were found to be subject to judicial scrutiny, and under various
required statutes, the court found Organization’s claims likely to prevail.
The court also found that if they did not grant the injunction, Organization
was likely to suffer irreparable harm due to BLM’s incomplete observance
of environmental laws. Finally, the court found that the balances of
hardships to BLM in relation to a preliminary injunction are not supported
in denouement of third quarter oil and gas sales. All subsequent quarters
and sales, however, were not found to be unduly burdened.
D. Montana
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dep’t of State, 317 F.Supp.3d
1118 (D. Mont. 2018).
Environmental organizations (“Advocates”) filed a motion for summary
judgment against the State Department (“Department”). Advocates alleged
that when Department published its record of decision and national interest
determination, and issued a Presidential permit allowing the construction of
a cross-border pipeline, it violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”). APA standards governed the review of Advocates’
claims, requiring that a rational connection must exist between the facts
found and the conclusions made in support of Department’s actions. If the
action is found to be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law, the court may set aside the action. The court found
that Department did violate NEPA because Department was required to
issue a supplemental environmental impact statement when it changed the
originally approved route of the pipeline. Agencies still have an obligation
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to prepare supplemental environmental impact statements where permitting
decisions have already been made, but the project is not yet complete.
Native Ecosystems Council v. Marten, CV 18-87-M-DLC, 2018 WL
3831339 (D. Mont. Aug. 13, 2018).
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) brought suit against Forester,
alleging that the failure to consult an amended forestation plan that may
affect an endangered species violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).
If an agency’s actions could have an effect, positive or negative, on an
endangered species or critical habitat, the agency must conduct a
consultation under ESA – this triggering threshold is very low, as Congress
has given first priority to the protection of listed species and habitats. The
court granted Advocates motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the
current forestation plan could have an adverse effect on an endangered
population as it reduces the amount of “old growth” forest that would be
preserved.
S.D. Ohio
Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 3:13-cv-115, 2018 WL
3978094 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2018).
Three companies (“Companies”) voluntarily entered into a settlement
agreement with the EPA and incurred cleanup costs of a contaminated site
containing hazardous waste. Companies later filed suit against other
allegedly responsible companies, Asphalt Company and Power and Light
Company (“P&L”), to recover costs Companies incurred from the cleanup
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). Both Asphalt Company and P&L
filed counterclaims against Companies asserting that they incurred response
costs of their own after release of hazardous substances from the cleanup
site. Companies moved to dismiss these counterclaims for failure to state a
claim. Under CERCLA, private parties may recover cleanup costs either
under section 107 or section 113. Under section 107, a private party may
recover costs they incurred voluntarily, and under section 113, parties who
are themselves liable under CERCLA may ask for compensation from other
responsible parties in order to distribute the cost of cleanup equitably.
Under the settlement agreement between Companies and the EPA,
Companies were protected from liability arising under section 113. Noting
precedent holding that remedies from either section are mutually exclusive,
the court held that since Asphalt Company and P&L were eligible for relief
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under section 113, they are thus not eligible for relief under section 107
even if such an outcome resulted in other companies shouldering a
disproportionate cost of cleanup. However, the court did allow for Asphalt
Company to recover cost of identifying other potentially responsible parties
since those costs fell outside the scope of the protections contained in the
settlement agreement between Companies and the EPA. Therefore, the
court sustained in part and overruled in part Companies’ motion to dismiss.
W.D. Virginia
Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 7:16cv00489, 2018
WL 4008993 (W.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2018).
Coal Producer entered into an agreement with Railroad to supply certain
minimum levels of coal to be transported by Railroad and sold at 23 power
plants. The contract stipulated that if Coal Producer did not meet its
minimum amount of coal, it must pay heavy fees to Railroad. It was
undisputed that these minimum volumes were not met and that Coal
Producer had paid millions of dollars in fees. At trial, Coal Producer
brought six claims: (1) to be excused from performance; (2) unjust
enrichment; (3) force majeure; (4) frustration of purpose; (5)
impracticability; or (6) rescission of the contract. First, the court held that a
factual question precluded summary judgment for excused performance
since it was alleged that Railroad entered into subsequent contracts with the
power plants, limiting their ability to buy from Coal Producer, which may
have constituted a breach of the duty of good faith, an issue to be decided
by the factfinder. However, because unjust enrichment was premised upon
the breach of contract in the first count, the claim for unjust enrichment
failed as a matter of law. Third, the court found that none of the
circumstances constituting a force majeure as defined in the contract had
occurred. Next, the court determined that Coal Producer failed to establish
that its ability to carry out the contract was commercially impracticable or
that the contract’s purpose had been frustrated. Finally, the court
determined that the final count, modification of the contract, was also based
on the findings of the jury on the issue of breach of contract. Thus,
summary judgment on this issue would be inappropriate.
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W.D. Washington
Seattle Times Co. v. LeatherCare, Inc., C15-1901 TSZ, 2018 WL 3873562
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2018).
Previous property owner (“Former”) brought suit against former tenant
(“Tenant”) for contaminating the property with hydrocarbons and
petroleum products in the course of Tenant’s dry-cleaning business,
violating the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as well as Washington’s Model Toxics Control
Act (“MTCA”). Tenant then brought suit against current property owner
(“Current”). Current countered and crossclaimed against Tenant and
Former. After Current bought the property, it had to excavate over 100,000
tons of contaminated soil and install injection wells to address the
contaminated ground water. The court found that the president of Tenant
was not personally liable for Current’s clean-up costs because he was not an
“operator” under CERCLA and applicable state law; however, Tenant as a
corporation was liable for seventy percent of Current’s soil transportation
and disposal costs while Former was liable for the remaining thirty percent.
Under the orphan share doctrine, Former, Tenant, and Current almost
evenly split liability for Current’s groundwater treatment and regulatory
review costs, with Current assuming slightly more liability than the others.
The orphan share doctrine governs that when liability for environmental
clean-up efforts fall on an insolvent or otherwise unavailable entity, the
liability will be equitably apportioned amongst the available, responsible
parties. Furthermore, because the parent company of Former obtained
Former as a sole shareholder rather than a successor company, the corporate
veil did not need to be pierced and parent company cannot assume Former’s
liability for Current’s clean-up costs under CERCLA.
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher
court as of publication.
State
California
Forest Pres. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., No. A148182, 2018
WL 4091010 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).
Society petitioned a writ of mandate against Department for allegedly
failing to properly assess a timber harvesting plan’s (“the Plan”) negative
environmental impacts before granting approval. The trial court denied the
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petition, and Society appealed to the California Court of Appeal. The court
reviewed the case de novo, but with deference to Department decisions and
Society bearing the burden of proving such decisions erroneous. The court
held that Department did not abuse its discretion, or violate the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), in choosing the California Air
Resources Board’s Scoping Plan to measure greenhouse gas emissions,
because there was no requirement to use the 2020 and 2050 emission
reduction targets as the goal. Department was also able to aptly explain how
the Scoping Plan would address the goals of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. The court held that the disagreement over which plan would
better advance the goals of reducing emissions, while maintaining the
forests, was not enough to merit a rejection of Department’s actions. The
court rejected Society’s claims that the Plan was required to have
quantitative data supporting the “carbon sequestration projections”, because
the CEQA does not have any such requirement. The court rejected
Society’s claims that Department’s analysis of the Plan’s cumulative
greenhouse gas effects was flawed, because the available information and
the expected carbon sequestration rate under the Scoping Plan allowed
Department to make a reasonable conclusion that the Plan’s “greenhouse
gas emissions will not significantly impact climate change.” The court
rejected claim of improper consideration of short-term carbon conditions,
because documents in the record plainly showed otherwise. The court held
the Plan’s mitigation measures were appropriate and legally enforceable,
because the Plan included a monitoring program by Department and a
permit-seeking requirement for any deviations from the Plan. The court
affirmed the lower court decision.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
San Francisco neighborhood association (“Association”) filed suit against
City alleging that City’s environmental impact report (“EIR”) did not
comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA") when City developed its 2009 plan for housing (“Housing
Element”). The lower court ruled that City’s EIR was sufficient except for
the analysis of project alternatives and possible mitigation measures.
Association appealed. The appellate court upheld all aspects of the EIR.
First, the court determined that the Housing Element EIR properly used
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future conditions of the city in calculating the environmental impacts of the
project since using current baseline conditions of the city would be
misleading given the city’s high level of growth. Second, the court held that
the EIR’s environmental impact analysis concluding that there would no
substantial impact on land use and aesthetics, traffic, and water were
adequate because: (1) the Housing element did not change any current land
use allowances or building restrictions; (2) the EIR noted potential traffic
increases but justified a low impact on traffic by encouraging and
identifying policy measures that would mitigate these effects; and (3) the
water use and source analysis sufficiently provided notice of possible
consequences of the proposed plan on water supply when it relied on a
water demand study. Lastly, the court held that Association had not met its
burden in proving the rage of alternatives provided and considered by
City’s EIR was manifestly unreasonable.
Sierra Club v. Cty. of Kern, No. F071133, 2018 WL 3360567 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 10, 2018).
Club sued County over County’s specific plans for regional development,
alleging that the attached environmental impact report (“EIR”) violated the
California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) by (1) improperly
examining long-term impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, (2) ineffectively
mitigating environmental impacts, (3) ineffectively mitigating impacts on
agricultural resources, and (4) “deferring the formulation mitigation
measures for air quality impacts.” The lower court rejected Club’s petition
for writ of mandate and claims, so Club appealed. This court reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. The court held that County
established its threshold of significance in relation to greenhouse gases
properly, because County examined other agencies’ thresholds of
significance, were reasonable at the time of creation, and did not conflict
with judicial precedent. County adequately considered the 2050 greenhouse
gas emission reduction target, but chose not to use it. The court held that
County had properly analyzed long term environmental affects, because the
EIR was made to evolve with new scientific knowledge and environmental
legislature. The court rejected Club’s assertions of gas emission exceptions
for small projects, because the EIR language was not suitable to such an
interpretation. The court rejected the assertion that County took position of
powerlessness in relation to land use mitigation and the assertion that
County would not consider transportation mitigation measures, because
language in the Specific Plan and the EIR discussed both of these issues.
The court held that County’s 1:1 ratio of agricultural conservation was
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proper, because such mitigation is not required as a matter of law and Club
fails to identify a defect in the scheme. The court held that the EIR
language requiring mitigation of negative air quality impacts “where
feasible” failed as an objective standard, and the court held that this failure
violated the CEQA. The court thus reversed and remanded the case.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC v. Pinal Cty., No. 1 CA-TX 16-0017, 2018 WL
3853598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2018).
Company leased property to Lessee for ranching purposes. Lessee made
improvements on the land. Company applied to County for agricultural
property tax classification, but County denied the application. Company
sued County for the denied classification, but County motioned to
significantly limit Company’s evidence showing that the land is used for
agricultural purposes. The lower court found for County, as Company could
not meet its burden. Company appealed. To be classified as agricultural,
grazing property must have “a minimum carrying capacity of forty animal
units and contain[ ] an economic feasible number of animal units,” and the
property must show “a reasonable expectation of operating profit, exclusive
of land cost, from the agricultural use of the property.” The legal
presumption is that County correctly denied the classification request,
though it may be overcome with a factual showing. Because of County’s
motion, Company could not produce evidence in regard to grazing lands or
the water use on the property. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
lower court erred in precluding Company’s evidence and remanded for a
new trial.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Massachusetts
Miramar Park Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Dennis, 105 N.E.3d 241 (Mass. 2018).
Association sued Town, in 2014, under the theory that Town violated state
environmental rules by placing materials dredged from a tidal river mouth
on a publicly-owned beach, rather than Association’s privately-owned
beach to fight sediment loss. The lower court granted summary judgment to
the Association, because Town’s 1990 expansion of the jetty activated
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responsibilities under 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.27 (2014) and denied
Town’s motion for summary judgment. The lower court even issued an
injunction requiring Town to dredge the river on occasion and deposit the
material on Association’s beach. Town appealed to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. The Court discussed the interplay of multiple state
statutes, which allowed citizens to bring complaints for environmental
damage, promulgation of wetland protection by local authorities, and
regulations of water quality that permitted Association to even bring this
suit against Town. The Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de
novo. The Court held that the actual disputed 2014 dredging did not create
an environmental harm. Additionally, the Court rejected the idea that the
1990 extension of the jetty by Town created ongoing obligations to renew
Association’s beach, because Association failed to prove that the jetty
expansion was made under “an order of conditions that was issued by the
conservation commission” that would actually create obligations under the
Massachusetts statute. This order is a necessary element to allowing such
environmental modifications, and only where an order of conditions was
attached that created an obligation to renew Association’s beach could such
an obligation exist. The Court held that no such order of conditions existed.
The Court concluded that Association had thus failed to prove
environmental harm from the dredging and no obligation form the jetty
expansion. The Court reversed the lower decision, vacated the injunction,
and granted summary judgment to Town.
Michigan
Howard v. Glenn Haven Shores Ass’n, No. 340174, 2018 WL 3594782
(Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2018).
Landowners brought suit against Association for damages to properties
incurred due to excessive erosion. Landowners owned three plots of land,
adjacent to Lake Michigan, located in the subdivision managed by
Association. Landowners claimed that the excessive runoff was due to
construction activities performed by Association and that Association owed
them a duty to take affirmative steps to lessen or stop surface water runoff
onto their property. The trial court granted Association's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that Association owed Landowners no duty to
affirmatively prevent erosion and runoff. Landowners appealed. The Court
of Appeals of Michigan affirmed the trial court's finding, ruling that
Association, as the dominant estate owner, owed no duty to take affirmative
action. The court did find, however, that dominant estate owners do have a
duty to refrain from negligent conduct that would increase the natural flow
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of surface water so as to cause more erosion than would otherwise occur
naturally. The court found that Landowners had not made a pleading
sufficient to support their claim and affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment ruling.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Minnesota
Minnesota Sands, LLC v. Cty. of Winona, 917 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App.
2018).
Mineral Company brought suit against County alleging that its zoning
ordinance banning companies from industrial mineral operations within
County was unconstitutional under both the Minnesota and United States
constitutions. Specifically, Company claimed that the zoning ordinance
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that the ordinance was a
regulatory taking of the Company’s property interest. However, the court
found that the provision in question was even-handed in its application,
burdened both in-state and out-of-state interests, and was not facially
discriminatory. Therefore, the provision did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Further, the court was not persuaded by Company’s
argument that the ordinance constituted a regulatory taking of its property
interest in the minerals in County. More precisely, the court held that
Company failed to fulfill a condition precedent necessary for its interest to
accrue. Thus, they were not compensable property interests. As such, the
court affirmed the previous summary judgment in favor of County.
New Jersey
State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 192 A.3d 996 (N.J. 2018).
New Jersey’s State Agriculture Development Committee (“SADC”),
seeking to enforce restrictions placed on the use of farmland by the
Agriculture Retention and Development Act (“ARDA”) and a deed of
easement’s command to conserve soil, brought action against a farmland
Owner to stop disruption of prime quality soil. The SADC initiated an
investigation of Owner, which showed that Owner excavated and leveled
twenty acres of the farm previously used for the production of crops to erect
hoop houses where flowers can be grown. The trial court granted summary
judgement in favor of SADC, halting Owner’s project and ordering the
remediation of the despoiled land. The appellate court reversed finding “the
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imperative of soil conservation had to be reconciled with the permissible
construction of buildings for agricultural purposes under both the deed of
easement and the ARDA.” The case then went before the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. The Court held that the appellate court erred in its grant of
summary judgement for the SADC. Based on the evidence, it was
determined that Owner permanently damaged soil in violation of the ARDA
and the existing SADC regulation. While Owner had the right to erect hoop
houses in furtherance of his business, Owner did not have the authority to
permanently damage a “wide swath of premier quality soil.” This court
acknowledged that SADC had yet to promulgate guidelines that would
permit farmland owners to make informed decisions about permissible
agricultural uses of land under the ARDA and similar deeds of easement.
However, even under the existing law and present deed, “any reasonable
person should have known that despoiling so much prime quality soil was
an unauthorized activity.” The Court remanded to the trial court to continue
with the prior ordered remediation plan.
Pennsylvania
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1571 C.D. 2017,
2018 WL 3637059 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 1, 2018).
Organization sought judicial review of the Pennsylvania Environmental
Hearing Board’s (“EHB”) decision to deny Organization’s petition to
challenge the Department of Environmental Protection’s approval of a
natural gas pipeline project. The court opined that their review of the
decision of the EHB could only extend to a determination of whether there
had been errors of law or constitutional violations and whether or not there
was substantial evidence to support the decision. The court found that EHB
did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that because Organization
failed to show “good cause” to permit the filing of the petition, EHB’s
decision was appropriate.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 193 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2018).
The reviewing court evaluated Board’s assessment of a civil penalty against
Company for the infiltration of wastewater into groundwater. The resulting
significant and undisputed pollution from the infiltration allowed for a fine
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of up to $10,000 per day, per violation under the terms of the Clean Streams
Law (“CSL”). Company disputed the amount of the penalty determined by
Board (the “maximum”), and the appellate review of the Board’s decision
was limited by administrative reviews, which limits review to questions of
law or clear error of fact. The court evaluated the Board’s decision based on
a record that supported Board’s contentions. The dispute, held as an
administrative hearing, took place over ten days and developed a
considerable record of fact, analysis, and conclusions of law. The ample
record allowed the court to point to multiple sources in favor of Board’s
assessment. Company challenged the penalty in its length of time
determination and willfulness enhancer. The Board’s determination of the
violation time relied on expert testimony that used scientific methods to
testify with a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that the pollution
took place as described. As it determined the testimony to be reasonable,
scientific, and contrary to Company’s allegation, the reviewing court
upheld the Board’s determination. The Board also relied on multiple
circumstances and evidentiary proofs to come to the conclusion that
Company acted willfully in failing to appropriately respond to the pollution.
The totality of the circumstances that Board considered, as well as specific
evidences of Company apparently ignoring significant notices of potential
problems, satisfied the reviewing court that Board’s determinations were
not arbitrary or capricious. The court also noted that there was no legal
error in Board’s calculations, as that court’s rulings to the contrary had been
overturned themselves by the state Supreme Court. Therefore, the court
upheld Board’s determination.
Flick v. Salerno, No. 1966 EDA 2016 & No. 551 EDA 2017, 2018 WL
4339662 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2018).
Owner-1 sought indemnification for penalties and costs associated with
groundwater pollution from Owner-2 and Engineer. Owner-2 was the prior
owner of the afflicted property, and alleged no knowledge of any pollution
or waste during the sale. Furthermore, Owner-1 had directed an
environmental inspection by Engineer of the property prior to completing
the sale. Years after the sale, a neighboring Company’s tests revealed
pollutant levels exceeding the state standards. Following the settlement of
litigation between Owner-1 and Company, in which Owner-1 admitted
responsibility and damages for the pollutants, Owner-1 filed the
indemnification action. The trial court denied the action as barred by the
statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed, noting that Owner-1
initially filed suit against Owner-2 long after a breach of contract claim
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would be timely. Even if the allegation was accurate, the court noted: (1)
Owner-1 acknowledged notice of a potential breach in 2003; (2) the statute
of limitations would run for four years; and (3) that the suit was filed in
2014. The court acknowledged that a pure indemnification claim may not
mature until judgment was finally determined in prior litigation, but noted
that the present indemnification claim, even if interpreted most favorably to
Owner-1, matured upon discovery of the damages that were arguably
negligently caused by a third-party, here Owner-2. Therefore, the same
analysis that barred the breach of contract claim related to indemnification,
in that the discovery of pollutants acted as notice of potential legal claims,
and the limitations of six years on indemnification claims had run prior to
filing. Lastly, the court affirmed fee shifting in favor of Owner-2 because
the claim properly came under the purview of the Clean Streams Law
which allows for fee shifting at the trial court’s discretion.
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